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Previous research focuses on firm and business unit level ambidexterity. Therefore, conceptual and empirically validatedunderstanding about ambidexterity at the individual level of analysis is very scarce. This paper addresses this gap
in the literature by investigating managers’ ambidexterity, delivering three contributions to theory and empirical research
on ambidexterity: first, by proposing three related characteristics of ambidextrous managers; second, by developing a
model and associated hypotheses on both the direct and interaction effects of formal structural and personal coordination
mechanisms on managers’ ambidexterity; and third, by testing the hypotheses based on a sample of 716 business unit level
and operational level managers.
Findings regarding the formal structural mechanisms indicate that a manager’s decision-making authority positively
relates to this manager’s ambidexterity, whereas formalization of a manager’s tasks has no significant relationship with this
manager’s ambidexterity. Regarding the personal coordination mechanisms, findings indicate that both the participation of a
manager in cross-functional interfaces and the connectedness of a manager to other organization members positively relate
to this manager’s ambidexterity. Furthermore, results show positive interaction effects between the formal structural and
personal coordination mechanisms on managers’ ambidexterity. The paper’s theoretical contributions and empirical results
increase our understanding about managers’ ambidexterity and about how different types and combinations of coordination
mechanisms relate to variation in managers’ ambidexterity.
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As current literature focuses on ambidexterity at the
business unit and firm level of analysis, conceptual and
empirically validated understanding about ambidexter-
ity at the individual level of analysis is very scarce
(Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008). Hence, scholars like
Gupta et al. (2006, p. 703) and Raisch and Birkinshaw
(2008, p. 397) suggest investigating ambidexterity at the
individual level of analysis as a promising direction for
future research. This paper addresses this gap in the liter-
ature by investigating managers’ ambidexterity. Existing
studies refer to ambidexterity as a firm’s or business
unit’s ability to combine exploration and exploitation
related activities (e.g. Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004,
O’Reilly and Tushman 2004). Based on these litera-
tures, we define ambidexterity at the manager level as
a manager’s behavioral orientation toward combining
exploration and exploitation related activities within a
certain period of time (cf. Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004,
p. 210; O’Reilly and Tushman 2004, p. 81; Tushman
and O’Reilly 1996, p. 24).
The relevance of investigating managers’ ambidex-
terity is emphasized by studies that discuss a firm’s
ability to become ambidextrous in terms of, for
instance, managers’ decision-making processes (Rivkin
and Siggelkow 2003), the extent to which managers
engage in routine and nonroutine activities (Adler et al.
1999), or managers’ collective and creative actions
(Sheremata 2000). In line with these authors, O’Reilly
and Tushman (2004, p. 81) conclude that “one of the
most important lessons is that ambidextrous organiza-
tions need ambidextrous senior teams and managers.”
These examples illustrate the importance of increased
understanding about ambidexterity at the manager level
of analysis and about what drives variation in managers’
ambidexterity.
Although some studies provide valuable examples of
managers’ ambidextrous behavior (e.g., O’Reilly and
Tushman 2004, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996), ambidex-
terity research at this level of analysis would benefit
from further conceptualization. We contribute to this
effort by proposing and clarifying three related charac-
teristics of ambidextrous managers: ambidextrous man-
agers host contradictions (Smith and Tushman 2005,
Tushman and O’Reilly 1996); they are multitaskers
(Birkinshaw and Gibson 2004, Floyd and Lane 2000);
and they both refine and renew their knowledge, skills,
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and expertise (Floyd and Lane 2000, Hansen et al. 2001,
Sheremata 2000).
The paper also delivers a contribution to our under-
standing about what drives variation in managers’
ambidexterity by developing a model and testing
hypotheses on the relations between managers’ ambidex-
terity and two generic types of coordination mech-
anisms, formal structural and personal coordination
mechanisms. Previous research indicates the importance
of these two types of coordination mechanisms as key
organizational elements that influence managers’ behav-
ior by shaping their relations and their interactions with
other individuals, groups, or organization units (e.g.,
Martinez and Jarillo 1989, Van De Ven et al. 1976).
The importance of both types of coordination mecha-
nisms is also reflected in the literature on ambidexterity
(Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008). Whereas some investiga-
tors highlight the importance of formal structural mech-
anisms for a firm’s pursuit of ambidexterity (e.g., Benner
and Tushman 2003, Duncan 1976), others illustrate the
importance of more personal relationships among orga-
nization members (e.g. Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004,
Sheremata 2000). Studies on coordination indicate that
different types of coordination mechanisms may differ-
ently affect organization members’ behavior (e.g., Daft
and Lengel 1986, Van De Ven et al. 1976). However,
much more remains to be understood about whether and
how the two different types of coordination mechanisms
differently relate to managers’ ambidexterity (Jansen
et al. 2006).
Several studies on ambidexterity argue that combining
different organizational elements may stimulate orga-
nization members’ ambidexterity, for example, combin-
ing “hard elements” and “soft elements” (Gibson and
Birkinshaw 2004, p. 213) or combining “centrifugal” and
“centripetal” elements (Sheremata 2000). However, both
conceptual and empirically validated insight on the com-
bined effect of such different organizational elements on
ambidexterity is scarce (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008,
Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003). To contribute to this issue
both theoretically and empirically, we will develop and
test hypotheses not only on the direct relations between
both types of coordination mechanisms and managers’
ambidexterity but also on the interaction effects between
the two types of mechanisms. With respect to the interac-
tion effects, Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008, p. 399) explic-
itly suggest that “future research could formally develop
and test propositions on how different antecedents inter-
act and complement one another in a firm’s pursuit of
organizational ambidexterity.”
Summarizing, this paper aims to deliver three con-
tributions to the literature on ambidexterity: first, by
proposing and clarifying three related characteristics of
ambidextrous managers by integrating insights from pre-
vious studies; second, by developing a model and asso-
ciated hypotheses on both direct and interaction effects
of formal structural and personal coordination mecha-
nisms on managers’ ambidexterity; and third, by testing
the hypotheses based on a sample of 716 managers. In
the next section, we elaborate on the concept of man-
agers’ ambidexterity and develop the model and asso-
ciated hypotheses. The methods section provides details
about the sample, data collection, and the development
and validation of the measurement instrument. Next we
present the empirical findings and conclude with a dis-
cussion of the results, implications, and issues for further
research.
Theory and Hypotheses
Managers’ Ambidexterity
Based on reviewing and integrating insights from
previous studies we propose the following three
related characteristics of ambidextrous managers: First,
ambidextrous managers host contradictions (Smith and
Tushman 2005, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). That is,
they have the motivation and ability to be sensitive to,
to understand, and to pursue a range of seemingly con-
flicting opportunities, needs, and goals (O’Reilly and
Tushman 2004). Related to this, previous research points
out the need for ambidextrous managers to deal with
conflict (Duncan 1976, Floyd and Lane 2000) and to
engage in paradoxical thinking (Gibson and Birkinshaw
2004, Smith and Tushman 2005). Examples from the
literature that illustrate this characteristic indicate that
ambidextrous managers search for new market needs and
technological opportunities while also being sensitive to
reinforce existing product-market positions (Burgelman
2002, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996); they both elaborate
on existing goals, beliefs, and decisions and reconsider
these (cf. Ghemawat and Ricart I Costa 1993, Rivkin and
Siggelkow 2003); and they have both a short-term and a
long-term orientation towards identifying and pursuing
opportunities (O’Reilly and Tushman 2004).
Second, ambidextrous managers are multitaskers; i.e.,
they fulfill multiple roles and conduct multiple differ-
ent tasks within a certain period of time (Birkinshaw
and Gibson 2004, p. 45; Floyd and Lane 2000).
Related to this, authors indicate that ambidextrous man-
agers are more generalists rather than more specialists
(Birkinshaw and Gibson 2004, Leana and Barry 2000).
The literature illustrates this characteristic by indicating
that ambidextrous managers fulfill multiple roles related
to both competence deployment and competence defi-
nition activities (Floyd and Lane 2000, Sanchez et al.
1996), conduct both routine and nonroutine activities
(Adler et al. 1999), carry out both creative and collec-
tive actions (Sheremata 2000), and typically act outside
the narrow confines of their own job (Adler et al. 1999,
Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004).
Third, ambidextrous managers both refine and renew
their knowledge, skills, and expertise (Floyd and Lane
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2000, Hansen et al. 2001, Sheremata 2000). Related
to this, prior research indicates the importance for
ambidextrous managers to acquire and process differ-
ent kinds of knowledge and information (Floyd and
Lane 2000, Sheremata 2000). Examples from the liter-
ature illustrate that ambidextrous managers engage in
both reliability-enhancing and variety-increasing learn-
ing activities (Holmqvist 2004, McGrath 2001), process
and acquire both explicit and tacit knowledge (Lubatkin
et al. 2006, Nonaka and Konno 1998), and engage in
both local and distant search for knowledge and infor-
mation within their network of contacts (Hansen et al.
2001, Subramaniam and Youndt 2005).
Direct Impact of Formal Structural Coordination
Mechanisms on Managers’ Ambidexterity
Formal structural coordination mechanisms are one
of the most important mechanisms for coordinating
activities. We focus in this study on decentralization and
formalization because these emerge most consistently
in studies of the components of the formal structure
(Miller and Dröge 1986). Furthermore, by focusing on
decentralization and formalization, we follow other stud-
ies that also investigate formal structural coordination
mechanisms (e.g., Jansen et al. 2006, Zmud 1982). To
investigate decentralization at the manager level of anal-
ysis, we focus on a manager’s decision-making authority
(Ghoshal et al. 1994, Sheremata 2000). To investigate
formalization at the manager level of analysis, we focus
on the extent of formalization of a manager’s tasks, i.e.,
on the degree to which rules and codes describe a par-
ticular task, and the degree to which the manager has to
conform to the task description (Hage 1965, Pugh et al.
1963).
A Manager’s Decision-Making Authority. A man-
ager’s decision-making authority is about the extent to
which a manager has decision-making authority over
how and which tasks the manager performs and his or
her ability to solve problems and to set goals (Atuahene-
Gima 2003, Dewar et al. 1980). Increasing man-
agers’ decision-making authority increases their sense
of responsibility for how they conduct their tasks and
the performance of these tasks (Tushman and O’Reilly
1996, Zmud 1982). This stimulates their willingness
to become aware and recognize a larger diversity of
organizational, market, and technological opportunities
and needs and to become more sensitive to understand-
ing how to act upon these different opportunities and
needs (Miller 1987, Pierce and Delbecq 1977, Tushman
and O’Reilly 1996). For instance, studies indicate that
increasing managers’ decision-making authority triggers
them not only to focus on short-term needs and associ-
ated benefits but also to increasingly attend to opportuni-
ties that will define the future (Pierce and Delbecq 1977,
Zmud 1982) and to the associated long-term benefits
(Miller 1987, O’Reilly and Tushman 2004). Related to
this, others indicate that increasing managers’ decision-
making authority increases their urge to seek solutions
to problems both within and outside the framework of
the existing strategy and beliefs (Ghemawat and Ricart
I Costa 1993, Sheremata 2000).
Furthermore, increased decision-making authority
increases managers’ self control and ownership of tasks
and decisions (Hage and Aiken 1967, Tushman and
O’Reilly 1996), which enables them to act upon the
recognized diversity of opportunities and needs and to
actively pursue a range of diverse goals (O’Reilly and
Tushman 2004, p. 81), i.e., to act ambidextrously. As
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004, p. 211) put it, increased
self control and ownership augments managers’ ability
“to make their own choices as to how they divide
their time between alignment- and adaptability-oriented
activities,” and it increases their aspiration to attain
to both efficiency and flexibility related goals (Adler
et al. 1999). Finally, due to increased decision-making
authority, managers have to rely more on their own skills
and expertise rather than on rules or the skills and exper-
tise of superiors (Hage and Aiken 1967). This increases
these managers’ motivation to refine their existing skills
and expertise as well as to develop new skills and exper-
tise (Crossan and Berdrow 2003, McGrath 2001, Floyd
and Lane 2000). These arguments suggest the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. A manager’s decision-making au-
thority will be positively related to this manager’s
ambidexterity.
Formalization of a Manager’s Tasks. Formalization of
a manager’s tasks refers to the degree to which rules
and codes describe a particular task; provide guides for
decision making; and provide guides for conveying deci-
sions, instructions, and information and the degree to
which the manager has to conform to the task descrip-
tion (Hage 1965, Pugh et al. 1963). Increasing for-
malization of managers’ tasks increases the possibility
that these managers become less receptive to decision-
making stimuli that are not monitored by formal sys-
tems (Cyert and March 1963). Hence, higher levels of
formalization are associated with singleness of purpose
(Pierce and Delbecq 1977); they decrease the range of
different opportunities and goals managers are likely to
pursue (Hage 1965, Miller 1987). This formalization is
negatively associated with their level of ambidexterity;
ambidextrous managers pursue a range of different goals
(Tushman and O’Reilly 1996) and “have the ability to
understand and be sensitive to the needs of very different
kinds of business” (O’Reilly and Tushman 2004, p. 81).
Moreover, for being able to pursue a range of differ-
ent goals and to deal with associated conflicts (Floyd
and Lane 2000), ambidextrous managers need to coop-
erate and to “combine their efforts” with other organi-
zation members (Birkinshaw and Gibson 2004, p. 49;
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Duncan 1976, p. 181). However, increasing formaliza-
tion of tasks increases managers’ sense of isolation
resulting from difficulties with comprehending the rela-
tionship between their tasks and a larger purpose (Organ
and Greene 1981). This may result in a reduced motiva-
tion to cooperate and combine efforts with others (Hage
and Aiken 1969, Pierce and Delbecq 1977). Increasing
formalization of managers’ tasks also necessitates that
they develop more expertise in a limited area (Hage
1965); it augments these managers’ level of specializa-
tion and their depth of knowledge within the confines of
the formalized tasks (Daft and Lengel 1986, Zander and
Kogut 1995). This reduces these managers’ ability to act
ambidextrously and to act outside the narrow confines of
their jobs (Adler et al. 1999). It also makes it more dif-
ficult for them to broaden their range of skills (Daft and
Lengel 1986), i.e., to be “more generalist” rather than
“more specialist” (Birkinshaw and Gibson 2004). These
arguments suggest the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Formalization of a manager’s tasks
will be negatively related to this manager’s ambidexterity.
Direct Impact of Personal Coordination
Mechanisms on Managers’ Ambidexterity
Besides formal structural coordination mechanisms, the
literature emphasizes the importance of “personal types”
(Cray 1984, p. 87) of coordination mechanisms. Such
coordination mechanisms comprise personal relation-
ships between organization members that typically cut
across organizational units and hierarchical levels and
include “direct contact, liaison roles, task forces, and
teams” (Galbraith 1973, p. 89; see also Egelhoff 1991,
Martinez and Jarillo 1989). Liaison roles, task forces,
and teams are more formal personal coordination mech-
anisms (Gupta and Govindarajan 2000) as compared to
direct contacts, which are more informal and volun-
tary modes of personal coordination (Tsai 2002). In this
study, we consider both types of personal relationships
by investigating participation in cross-functional inter-
faces by a manager, i.e., liaison roles, task forces, and
teams (cf. Gupta and Govindarajan 2000), and a man-
ager’s direct contacts in terms of the manager’s connect-
edness to other organization members (cf. Jaworski and
Kohli 1993).
Participation in Cross-Functional Interfaces by a
Manager. Cross-functional interfaces encompass lateral
integration mechanisms such as liaison personnel,
task forces, and teams (Galbraith 1973, Gupta and
Govindarajan 2000). Participation of managers in cross-
functional interfaces increases their cooperation with
other managers of different functions, units, and hierar-
chical levels (Galbraith 1973, Miller 1987). These other
managers are likely to differ in their relationship to the
firm’s existing strategy, goals, interests, time horizon,
core values, and emotional tone (Floyd and Lane 2000,
Whetten 1978). Hence, besides bringing in their own
specialized expertise, and besides representing the inter-
est of their own specific group, managers who partici-
pate in cross-functional interfaces also have to think and
act outside the narrow confines of their own job and
position; i.e., they have to understand and take into con-
sideration the interests, perspectives, beliefs, and values
of other managers (Duncan 1976, Floyd and Lane 2000,
Miller 1987).
Furthermore, cross-functional interfaces increase trust
between managers of differentiated units (Adler et al.
1999, Galbraith 1973), which is “a critical contextual
factor” for managers to “shift the tradeoff between effi-
ciency and flexibility” (Adler et al. 1999, p. 63). It creates
a supportive context for managers with different back-
grounds to cooperate and learn from each other (Gibson
and Birkinshaw 2004). Related to this, Duncan (1976)
points out that participation in cross-functional interfaces
enables managers’ ambidextrous behavior by allowing
them to confront and resolve conflicts regarding different
goals, needs, and interests between differentiated orga-
nizational units and hierarchical levels. Managers’ par-
ticipation in cross-functional interfaces also positively
relates to their ambidexterity by offering opportuni-
ties to exchange knowledge (Egelhoff 1991, Gupta and
Govindarajan 2000). Cross-functional interfaces offer
opportunities for managers to refine their existing knowl-
edge by acquiring knowledge that is related to their own
knowledge base. These interfaces serve, for instance,
as mechanisms to exchange knowledge and informa-
tion regarding best practices of related technologies, pro-
cesses, or markets, allowing managers to increase or
refine their skills and expertise in a limited or spe-
cialized area (Henderson and Cockburn 1994, Jansen
et al. 2005). At the same time, by participating in cross-
functional interfaces, managers renew their knowledge
base by acquiring new or unrelated knowledge from man-
agers with different expertise (Egelhoff 1991, Ghoshal
and Bartlett 1988). These arguments suggest the follow-
ing hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. Participation in cross-functional in-
terfaces by a manager will be positively related to this
manager’s ambidexterity.
Connectedness of a Manager to Other Organization
Members. Connectedness of a manager relates to the
extent to which the manager is networked to other organi-
zation members across hierarchical levels and organiza-
tional units in terms of direct personal contacts (Jaworski
and Kohli 1993, Sheremata 2000). It refers to the size
of the manager’s network of direct contacts across hier-
archical levels and organizational units and to the pat-
tern of the manager’s network in terms of density (Jansen
et al. 2006, Jaworski and Kohli 1993, Sheremata 2000).
An increasing size of a manager’s network of direct con-
tacts across hierarchical levels and organizational units is
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associated with increasing possibilities for that manager
to identify and acquire knowledge for both exploration
and exploitation purposes (Hansen et al. 2001, p. 26;
Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, p. 248; Subramaniam and
Youndt 2005). A manager may benefit from using net-
work contacts by acquiring new and diverse knowledge
to, for instance, develop new competences (Floyd and
Lane 2000), pursue radical innovations (Subramaniam
and Youndt 2005), or find innovative solutions to prob-
lems (Sheremata 2000). A manager may also benefit
from using network contacts by obtaining related and
complementary knowledge to, for instance, improve and
refine existing competences (Floyd and Lane 2000), pur-
sue incremental innovations (Subramaniam and Youndt
2005), or reinforce existing beliefs and decisions (Rivkin
and Siggelkow 2003).
Increasing levels of density of direct personal con-
tacts within a manager’s network is associated with
an increased ability by that manager to acquire and
understand complex and ambiguous knowledge from the
network contacts (Hansen et al. 2001) and to engage
in reciprocal, nonroutine information processing (Daft
and Lengel 1986, Egelhoff 1991). These characteristics
enable that manager to reduce equivocality surrounding
exploratory tasks (Daft and Lengel 1986; Lubatkin et al.
2006, p. 648). At the same time, increasing levels of
density within a network increases trust and cooperation
and decreases the likelihood of goal conflict within the
network (Adler and Kwon 2002, Rowley et al. 2000),
which benefits the exploitation of new knowledge and
the implementation of innovations (Jansen et al. 2005,
Sheremata 2000).
These arguments suggest that connectedness is pos-
itively related to a manager’s ambidextrous behavior.
However, beyond a moderate level, increasing levels of
a manager’s connectedness may have dampening effects
on that manager’s ambidexterity. Increasingly dense net-
works diffuse strong norms, establish shared behavioral
expectations, and create a dominant logic (Bettis and
Wong 2003, Miller 1993, Rowley et al. 2000). First, this
reduces managers’ openness to different opportunities,
needs, and perspectives (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998),
which reduces their motivation and ability to host con-
tradictions (Smith and Tushman 2005). Second, it con-
strains managers to perform broad searches for acquir-
ing knowledge and information (Jansen et al. 2005),
which reduces their ability to both refine and renew
their knowledge base (Hansen et al. 2001, Sheremata
2000). Furthermore, a large and densely connected net-
work may decrease managers’ ability to engage in high
levels of both exploration and exploitation related activ-
ities because maintaining such a network requires time
and effort to stay in touch and interact with others
(Hansen et al. 2001, Uzzi 1997). Hansen et al. (2001),
for instance, show that maintaining a densely connected
network is associated with reduced speed and efficiency
in completing both explorative and exploitative projects.
These arguments suggest the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. There will be an inverted U-shaped re-
lationship between connectedness of a manager to other
organization members and this manager’s ambidexterity.
Interaction Effects Between Formal Structural and
Personal Coordination Mechanisms
A Manager’s Decision-Making Authority and Partici-
pation in Cross-Functional Interfaces. As argued above,
increasing decision-making authority of managers posi-
tively relates to their ambidexterity by increasing their
freedom and ability to actively pursue a range of
diverse goals (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004, O’Reilly
and Tushman 2004). However, increasing freedom to
actively pursue a range of diverse goals confronts man-
agers with the challenge to reduce uncertainty and equiv-
ocality about which goals to pursue, about how to pursue
a range of diverse goals, and about the possible out-
comes of the goals being pursued (Floyd and Lane
2000, Smith and Tushman 2005). Participation in cross-
functional interfaces increases managers’ opportunities
and ability to reduce such uncertainty and equivocal-
ity (Daft and Lengel 1986, Miller 1987), for instance,
by promoting thorough and multifaceted assessments of
problems, proposals, and projects; by exchanging infor-
mation, opinions, and judgments with experts; by elic-
iting factual arguments from managers who have to
defend their proposals before peers; and by offering
opportunities for consultation (Daft and Lengel 1986,
Egelhoff 1991, Miller 1987).
Furthermore, as increasing decision-making authority
of managers enables them to pursue a range of diverse
goals (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004, O’Reilly and
Tushman 2004), authors indicate the importance for
ambidextrous managers to deal with conflict. Pursu-
ing multiple and different goals is associated with
getting confronted with other managers who hold dif-
ferent expectations, who have different perspectives, and
who pursue contrasting goals (Duncan 1976, p. 180;
Floyd and Lane 2000, p. 162; Smith and Tushman
2005, p. 525). Participation in cross-functional interfaces
increases managers’ ability to effectively confront and
resolve conflicts with other managers in several ways—
for example, by stimulating discussion and cooperation
among them (Duncan 1976, p. 181), by stimulating trust
among them (Adler et al. 1999, p. 52), and by motivating
systematic attempts to scrutinize and reconcile divergent
perspectives (Miller 1987, p. 11).
Finally, increasing decision-making authority of man-
agers positively relates to their ambidexterity by increas-
ing their motivation to use and refine their existing
skills and expertise as well as to develop new skills
and expertise (Crossan and Berdrow 2003, McGrath
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2001, Floyd and Lane 2000). Participation in cross-
functional interfaces increases managers’ opportunities
to do so by creating a context for managers with dif-
ferent backgrounds to learn from each other (Gibson
and Birkinshaw 2004) and by offering opportunities
to exchange knowledge which enables participants to
acquire both new and diverse knowledge and related
and complementary knowledge (Egelhoff 1991, Jansen
et al. 2005). These arguments suggest the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5. There will be positive interaction
effects between a manager’s decision-making authority
and participation in cross-functional interfaces by the
manager, on this manager’s ambidexterity.
A Manager’s Decision-Making Authority and Connect-
edness. Increasing managers’ decision-making authority
positively relates to these managers’ ambidexterity by
stimulating their willingness to become aware and recog-
nize a large diversity of organizational, market, and tech-
nological opportunities and needs (Pierce and Delbecq
1977, Sheremata 2000, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996).
Increasing the size of managers’ networks helps them to
become more aware and recognize a larger diversity of
such opportunities and needs, by creating more possi-
bilities to search for and identify different ideas, infor-
mation, and inputs from organization members across
hierarchical levels and organizational units (Birkinshaw
and Gibson 2004, Burt 1992, Jaworski and Kohli 1993).
Furthermore, increasing the decision-making author-
ity of managers positively relates to their ambidexter-
ity because it makes them more sensitive to thoroughly
understanding the identified diverse needs and opportu-
nities before acting upon them (Adler et al. 1999, Shere-
mata 2000). However, understanding ideas, information,
and inputs from different units and levels in an orga-
nization may be difficult because they tend to develop
different languages, world views, and thought worlds
(Burns and Stalker 1961, Duncan 1976). Increasing con-
nectedness of a manager to other organization members
enhances this manager’s ability to better understand and
act upon the identified diverse needs and opportunities.
This understanding can be improved through the ability
of densely connected networks to reduce ambiguity sur-
rounding different needs and opportunities by engag-
ing into frequent, reciprocal, and nonroutine information
processing (Daft and Lengel 1986, Egelhoff 1991).
Finally, as indicated by Hypothesis 4, increasingly
dense networks may have dampening effects on man-
agers’ ambidexterity by diffusing strong norms and cre-
ating a dominant logic (Bettis and Wong 2003, Miller
1993, Rowley et al. 2000). This constrains managers
to perform broad searches for knowledge and informa-
tion (Jansen et al. 2005), and it reduces their open-
ness to different opportunities, needs, and perspec-
tives (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). Increasing levels
of managers’ decision-making authority may, how-
ever, countervail these negative effects of densely con-
nected networks (Sheremata 2000, p. 401). For instance,
increasing decision-making authority stimulates man-
agers to broaden their search for knowledge and infor-
mation outside their current network of contacts (Jansen
et al. 2005, p. 1001), leading to a richer network of
diverse knowledge (Hage and Aiken 1967, p. 510).
Related to this, others have indicated that increasing
decision-making authority enlarges the diversity of man-
agers’ perspectives (Zmud 1982), increases variety in
their experience (McGrath 2001), and enlarges the range
of diverse solutions they find to problems (Atuahene-
Gima 2003). These arguments suggest the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6. There will be positive interaction
effects between a manager’s decision-making authority
and connectedness of the manager to other organization
members, on this manager’s ambidexterity.
Formalization of a Manager’s Tasks and Participation
in Cross-Functional Interfaces. Increasing formalization
of managers’ tasks negatively relates to their ambidexter-
ity by fostering singleness of purpose and hence decreas-
ing the range of different goals these managers are likely
to pursue (Hage 1965, Pierce and Delbecq 1977). Partic-
ipation in cross-functional interfaces may reduce these
effects of formalization; it forces managers to increase
the range of different goals to take into consideration
(Miller 1987, Whetten 1978) because it demands that
they cooperate with other managers who are likely to
differ in terms of interests, perspectives, beliefs, and val-
ues (Duncan 1976).
Furthermore, increasing formalization of managers’
tasks negatively relates to managers’ ambidexterity
because it increases their sense of isolation resulting
in a reduced motivation of these managers to combine
efforts with others (Hage and Aiken 1969, Organ and
Greene 1981). The literature indicates, however, that par-
ticipation in cross-functional interfaces pulls managers
out of their isolation and increases their motivation to
combine efforts with others. For instance, it positively
influences motivation to work together to solve problems
(Sheremata 2000), to implement innovations (Duncan
1976), and to generate mutual commitment to make and
realize decisions (Bahrami and Evans 1987).
Finally, increasing formalization of managers’ tasks
negatively relates to these managers’ ambidexterity
by stimulating them to increasingly develop expertise
within the specialized area of their formalized tasks
(Hage 1965, Zander and Kogut 1995) and by making
it more difficult for them to broaden their knowledge
and skill base (Daft and Lengel 1986). Effective partic-
ipation in cross-functional interfaces, however, requires
managers to understand, enter into discussion, and inter-
act with managers from different fields of expertise
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and with different knowledge (Egelhoff 1991, Ghoshal
and Bartlett 1988). Consequently, participation in cross-
functional interfaces stimulates managers to learn from
each other (Nonaka and Konno 1998); to broaden their
expertise beyond the narrow confines of their own job
(Bahrami and Evans 1987, Miller 1987); and to broaden
their knowledge base by acquiring, assimilating, and
using new knowledge (Jansen et al. 2005). These argu-
ments suggest the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 7. There will be positive interaction
effects between formalization of a manager’s tasks and
participation in cross-functional interfaces by the man-
ager, on this manager’s ambidexterity.
Formalization of a Manager’s Tasks and Connected-
ness. Increasing formalization of managers’ tasks nega-
tively relates to these managers’ ambidexterity because
formalization increases the possibility that a manager
becomes less receptive to decision-making stimuli that
are not monitored by formal systems (Cyert and March
1963). An increasing size of managers’ networks across
organization units and hierarchical levels may more than
compensate for these effects of formalization by extend-
ing the number of information channels by which a
manager can access valuable ideas, insights, and infor-
mation (Burt 1992, Ghoshal et al. 1994). Furthermore,
an increasingly dense network of personal contacts
positively influences the speed by which these ideas,
insights, and information become available to the net-
work members (Burt 1992, Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).
Increasing formalization of managers’ tasks negatively
relates to their ambidexterity by reducing the extent
to which these managers establish and maintain inter-
personal relations (Hage and Aiken 1969, Pugh et al.
1963). Moreover, it may increase a sense of isola-
tion, resulting in a reduced motivation to cooperate and
combine efforts with others (Organ and Greene 1981,
Pierce and Delbecq 1977). Increasing levels of con-
nectedness with other organization members may com-
pensate these effects because doing so is directly asso-
ciated with establishing and maintaining an increasing
number of interpersonal relations (Jaworksi and Kohli
1993). Furthermore, increasing levels of densely con-
nected relations decreases the network members’ sense
of isolation and increases their motivation to cooper-
ate and combine efforts by developing trust and mutual
identification (Adler and Kwon 2002, Coleman 1990),
by providing a common frame of reference (Coleman
1990, Uzzi 1997), and by reducing the probability of
opportunistic behavior (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001).
Finally, increasingly dense networks may have damp-
ening effects on a manager’s ambidexterity because
maintaining a large and densely connected network
requires time and effort which is associated with
increased costs and reduced efficiency in performing
tasks and with reduced speed in completing both explo-
rative and exploitative projects (Hansen et al. 2001, Uzzi
1997). Increasing levels of formalization of managers’
tasks may undo these negative effects of increasing lev-
els of connectedness as increasing formalization of tasks
is associated with higher production, greater efficiency
in performance, and increased speed of decision making
(Baum and Wally 2003, Hage 1965, Hall et al. 1967).
These arguments suggest the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 8. There will be positive interaction
effects between formalization of a manager’s tasks and
connectedness of the manager to other organization
members, on this manager’s ambidexterity.
Methods
Sample and Data Collection
We followed existing quantitative studies on managers’
activities that typically draw upon a sample composed
of a large number of managers of a small number of
firms (e.g., Ghoshal et al. 1994, Ireland et al. 1987,
Walsh 1988). To test the hypotheses, we obtained data
through a survey of managers in five large firms. Each
of these firms ranks among the top 25 on the For-
tune Global 500 (2007) in terms of total revenues in
their industry. The choice of these five companies was
a result of several considerations. To minimize com-
promising the external validity of the findings due to
industry specific effects, we selected firms that oper-
ate in different manufacturing and service industries
(Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004): electronics (Firm A),
financial services (Firm B), accountancy and profes-
sional services (Firm C), telecommunications (Firm D),
and chemicals (Firm E). Furthermore, investigating man-
agers’ ambidexterity compelled us to examine managers
whose firms are confronted with pressures to explore and
with pressures to exploit. Several studies (e.g., Banker
et al. 2005, Flier et al. 2001, Gibson and Birkinshaw
2004, Henisz and Macher 2004) indicate that firms in the
selected industries are forced to explore due to changes
regarding technologies, customer demands, competition,
and regulation. These studies also indicate that these
firms are forced at the same time to exploit due to
short-term competitive pressures in terms of an increased
focus on efficiency and cutting costs and the increas-
ing importance of economies of scale. Moreover, focus-
ing on large firms increased the possibility to observe
variance not only in this study’s dependent variable but
also in the explanatory variables (Ghoshal et al. 1994,
McDonough and Leifer 1983).
In each of the firms, the survey was sent, in con-
sultation with corporate top management, to a number
of selected managers. These are business unit level and
operational level managers with various functional back-
grounds such as research and development, marketing
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and sales, and operations. Furthermore, the managers
represent a wide variety in terms of demographic char-
acteristics such as age, job tenure, functional tenure, and
education. The survey was sent to 1,797 managers. For
each firm, chi-square tests (p < 005; = 005) indicate
that the distribution of the managers over the hierarchi-
cal levels and functional areas corresponds to the dis-
tribution of all managers. This indicates that bias due
to the sampling procedure may not be a problem. To
ensure confidentiality, we agreed not to reveal the names
of the respondents, who returned the completed surveys
to us without interference from corporate management.
We received 755 completed surveys, corresponding to a
response rate of 42%. List-wise deletion of cases with
missing values reduced the final sample size to 716;1 i.e.
110, 161, 186, 148, and 111 managers of Firm A, B,
C, D, and E, respectively. This sample included 215
business unit level managers and 501 operational level
managers. The average age of the managers is 39 years,
the average job tenure within the firm is 10 years, and
the average span of control is 41 employees.
We examined differences between respondents and
nonrespondents to test for nonresponse bias. Chi-square
tests (p < 005;  = 005) indicate that the distribution
of the respondents over the firms, hierarchical levels, and
functions corresponds to the population’s distribution.
We also compared early and late respondents (t-test; p <
005) in terms of demographic characteristics and model
variables because late respondents can be expected to
be similar to nonrespondents (Armstrong and Overton
1977). No significant differences appeared, indicating
that nonresponse bias may not be a problem.
Measures and Validation
Dependent Variable. We constructed a scale to mea-
sure a manager’s ambidexterity beccuase an appropriate
scale at the individual level was not available in the lit-
erature. Scales of firm or business unit ambidexterity
are constructed by combining measures of exploration
and exploitation (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004, He and
Wong 2004, Lubatkin et al. 2006). Following this prac-
tice, we started by developing measures for exploration
and exploitation at the manager level of analysis.
To develop these measures, we took the following
steps. First, following the definition of ambidexterity at
the manager level, we developed seven manager’s explo-
ration activity items and seven manager’s exploitation
activity items. To enhance content validity, we devel-
oped these items based on the features by which March
(1991, p. 71) characterized the constructs of exploration
and exploitation and based on studies that illustrate man-
agers’ ambidextrous behavior in terms of exploration
and exploitation related activities (e.g., Adler et al. 1999,
Floyd and Lane 2000, Ghemawat and Ricart I Costa
1993, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). Second, to fur-
ther increase content validity and to enhance the word-
ing of the items, six in-depth interviews were held by
the authors with managers of various hierarchical and
functional positions of firms A, B, and C. During the
interviews, managers were asked to complete the ques-
tionnaire, to indicate the relevance of the items, and
to indicate any ambiguity regarding the phrasing of the
items. Based on these interviews, the content and phras-
ing of the items were further enhanced by the authors,
a process which resulted in a test version of the survey.
Third, to allow enhancement of the reliability, unidimen-
sionality, and convergent and discriminant validity of
the exploration and exploitation scales, we quantitatively
tested the scales based on data we obtained through a
test version of the survey of 33 managers of various hier-
archical and functional positions of firms A, B, and C.
Following reliability and validity analyses, five ambigu-
ous items of the exploration and exploitation scales were
identified. Fourth, during 12 in-depth interviews with
managers of various hierarchical and functional posi-
tions of firms A, B, and C, managers were asked to
suggest improvements to the ambiguous items as iden-
tified at the previous step. Based on these interviews,
we further enhanced the phrasing of these items, a pro-
cess that resulted in the final version of the scales. The
exploration scale determines the extent to which a man-
ager engaged in exploration activities last year, whereas
the exploitation scale determines the extent to which the
manager engaged in exploitation activities last year.
To check for convergent and discriminant validity, we
performed exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses.
Exploratory factor analysis (see Table 1) with Varimax
rotation with all 14 items, based on the survey data,
revealed that two summated scales could be constructed;
one exploration scale with the seven exploration items
and one exploitation scale with the seven exploitation
items. Eigenvalues for each factor were greater than 3.6,
all items loaded on their appropriate factors at greater
than 0.69, and no item cross-loading was greater than
0.18. Both scales are reliable: exploration  = 090;
exploitation = 087. We conducted confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) of the 14 items to check for discriminant
validity of the constructs. Results indicate that the two-
factor model fits the data well (NFI= 093, CFI= 095,
RMSEA < 007). Moreover, a comparison of a one-
factor model with a two-factor model shows a significant
improvement in fit (2 significant at p < 0001), pro-
viding evidence of discriminant validity (Bagozzi and
Phillips 1982).
Prior studies combine exploration and exploita-
tion measures to assess ambidexterity (Gibson and
Birkinshaw 2004, He and Wong 2004, Lubatkin et al.
2006). Gibson and Birkinshaw’s (2004, p. 211) concep-
tualization of ambidexterity explicitly takes the ambidex-
trous behavior of individuals into consideration. In our
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Table 1 Factor Analysis for Managers’ Ambidexterity
Factorsb
Itemsa
To what extent did you, last year, engage
in work related activities that can be
characterized as follows:
1 2
A manager’s exploration activities (= 090)
Searching for new possibilities with
respect to products/services,
processes, or markets
082 −005
Evaluating diverse options with respect to
products/services, processes, or
markets
084 −005
Focusing on strong renewal of
products/services or processes
079 −002
Activities of which the associated yields or
costs are currently unclear
074 −005
Activities requiring quite some adaptability
of you
083 001
Activities requiring you to learn new skills
or knowledge
076 −006
Activities that are not (yet) clearly existing
company policy
072 −013
A manager’s exploitation activities (= 087)
Activities of which a lot of experience has
been accumulated by yourself
008 075
Activities which you carry out as if it were
routine
−018 071
Activities which serve existing (internal)
customers with existing
services/products
−008 075
Activities of which it is clear to you how to
conduct them
−011 080
Activities primarily focused on achieving
short-term goals
−003 069
Activities which you can properly conduct
by using your present knowledge
−003 081
Activities which clearly fit into existing
company policy
000 075
aItems are quoted from our survey. All items were measured on a
seven-point scale (1= to a very small extent to 7= to a very large
extent).
bExtraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation
method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization. Explained variance:
60%.
study on individual level ambidexterity, we followed
their approach by assessing managers’ ambidexterity by
computing the multiplicative interaction between man-
agers’ exploration activities and managers’ exploitation
activities.
Independent Variables. This study’s measures of the
formal structural and personal coordination mechanisms
are based on existing scales. To measure the extent
of a manager’s decision-making authority, we used a
four item scale of Dewar et al. (1980), which assesses
the extent to which a manager has decision-making
authority in the performance of his or her tasks and in
his or her ability to set goals (= 091). To assess the
extent of formalization of a manager’s tasks, this study
used a four item scale from Desphande and Zaltman
(1982), which measures the extent to which a manager’s
tasks are defined by rules, procedures, or regulations
(= 089). To measure participation in cross-functional
interfaces by a manager, this study used a scale on
the basis of Nadler and Tushman (1987) and Gupta
and Govindarajan (2000), which assesses the extent to
which a manager participates in cross-unit and cross-
hierarchical integrative mechanisms, asking each man-
ager to what extent he or she (1) coordinates work across
internal organizational boundaries, (2) works in tempo-
rary task forces, and (3) works in permanent teams.
Following Gupta and Govindarajan (2000, p. 495) and
Jansen et al. (2005, p. 1005), we constructed the final
measure as a weighted average of the three items, where
the first item is given a weight of 1, the second item a
weight of 2, and the last item a weight of 3. To mea-
sure connectedness of a manager to other organization
members, a four-item scale based on Jaworski and Kohli
(1993) and Jansen et al. (2006) was used, which assessed
the extent to which a manager is networked or connected
to other organization members across hierarchical levels
and organizational units in terms of direct personal con-
tacts (= 087). Prior to the creation of the interaction
terms in the regression models, we mean centered the
independent variables to reduce multicollinearity (Aiken
and West 1991). Appendix 1 shows the items of the
independent variables.
Control Variables. Managers’ experience may influ-
ence their ambidexterity: increased levels of experience
are associated with an increased ability to interpret and
deal with a larger diversity of ambiguous cues (Daft
and Lengel 1986, p. 555). The broadness of experience
also matters because an ambidextrous manager’s skill
base is “more generalist” rather than “more specialist”
(Birkinshaw and Gibson 2004, p. 49). To control for
experience, we included a manager’s age and tenure
within the firm, which are expected to positively relate to
managers’ ambidexterity (Tushman and O’Reilly 1996,
p. 27). We also included a manager’s tenure in his or her
current function, which is associated with increasing lev-
els of specialization and hence is expected to negatively
relate to the manager’s ambidexterity (cf. Birkinshaw
and Gibson 2004, p. 49). Increasing levels of education
are associated with increasing cognitive abilities to pro-
cess information and learning (Papadakis et al. 1998),
which may positively relate to managers’ ambidexterity
(Adler et al. 1999, p. 51). We controlled for educational
effects by including two dummy variables; one reflecting
managers with master’s degrees or higher, and another
reflecting managers with bachelor’s degrees, making
managers with degrees below the bachelor’s level the
reference group. Exploration and exploitation compete
for scarce resources (March 1991). Managers of larger
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units may have more resources at their disposal, which
can be allocated to both exploration and exploitation
activities (Lewin et al. 1999). To control for size effects,
we included the natural log of the number of subordi-
nates of a manager. The hierarchical level of a manager
may impact upon the manager’s level of ambidexter-
ity. Higher level managers are typically expected to be
more ambidextrous than lower level managers (Floyd
and Lane 2000, p. 158; O’Reilly and Tushman 2004).
We distinguished business unit level managers and oper-
ational level managers and controlled for hierarchical
level effects by including one dummy variable (busi-
ness unit level= 1, operational level= 0). Business unit
level managers had at least two levels of supervisors
under their responsibility and were no more than two
reporting levels below top executives. Operational level
managers report to business unit managers or to levels
below these managers (cf. Ireland et al. 1987, p. 474).
Levels of managers’ exploration and exploitation activ-
ities may differ across functional areas (Duncan 1976).
We created three dummy variables, one for research
and development (R&D), one for marketing and sales
(M&S), and one for operations, to control for functional
effects. Dummies for R&D and M&S are included in the
regression models. Environmental dynamism may influ-
ence the extent to which a manager engages in explo-
ration or exploitation activities or both (Jansen et al.
2006, Lewin et al. 1999). We therefore included a four-
item scale (= 089) that captured the degree of envi-
ronmental dynamism that a manager faces (Dill 1958,
Jansen et al. 2006). Sample items are “My (internal or
external) clients regularly ask for complete new products
and services” and “In my business, changes are intense.”
Finally, to control for organizational contextual factors
(Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004), we created dummy vari-
ables reflecting the five firms. No dummy has been
included for Firm E, making this firm the reference
firm.
Validation. We conducted exploratory and confirma-
tory factor analyses including all items of this study’s
constructs, i.e., those measuring exploration, exploita-
tion, and the four coordination mechanisms, to assess
construct validity of the measures. Results of the
exploratory factor analysis (extraction method: princi-
pal component analysis; rotation method: Varimax with
Kaiser normalization) indicate that the measures were
appropriately constructed; eigenvalues for each factor
were greater than one, all items loaded on their appro-
priate factors at greater than 0.67, and no item cross-
loading was greater than 30, supporting the six-factor
solution. We conducted an integrated confirmatory fac-
tor analysis on all items. We allowed each item to load
only on the factor for which it was a proposed indicator.
Results indicate that the six-factor model fits the data
well (NFI= 092, CFI= 095, RMSEA< 005). More-
over, a comparison of a one-factor model with a two-
factor model for every pair among the factors shows a
significant improvement in fit for each of the 15 pairs
(2 significant at p < 0001), providing evidence of
discriminant validity (Bagozzi and Phillips 1982).
Analysis and Results
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for
all variables. Table 3 presents the results of the hierar-
chical regression analyses for managers’ ambidexterity.
To examine multicollinearity, we calculated the vari-
ance inflation factor (VIF) for each of the regression
equations. VIFs are between 3.48 and 1.08, which is
below the rule-of-thumb cutoff of 10 (Neter et al. 1990);
issues of multicollinearity seem not to be a problem.
Among the control variables, the full model—Model 3
of Table 3—shows that age and tenure in the current
function negatively relate to managers’ ambidexterity,
that tenure in the firm and environmental dynamism pos-
itively relate to managers’ ambidexterity, that business
unit level managers are more ambidextrous than oper-
ational level managers, and that managers of Firm A
are more ambidextrous than those of the reference Firm,
whereas managers of Firm D are less ambidextrous.
Tests of Main Effects. Model 2 of Table 3 shows the
main effects referring to Hypotheses 1–4. This model
shows that a manager’s decision-making authority posi-
tively relates to this manager’s ambidexterity (= 014,
p < 0001), supporting Hypothesis 1. The coefficient for
formalization of a manager’s tasks is positive and not
significant ( = 003, ns); hence, Hypothesis 2 is not
supported. Participation of a manager in cross-functional
interfaces positively relates to the manager’s ambidex-
terity ( = 019, p < 0001), supporting Hypothesis 3.
Regarding connectedness of a manager to other organi-
zation members, we predicted an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship with this manager’s ambidexterity. As Model 2
shows, the coefficient for connectedness is positive and
significant ( = 017, p < 0001). However, the coeffi-
cient for the squared term is positive and not significant
( = 003, ns). Accordingly, the relationship between a
manager’s connectedness to other organization members
and the manager’s ambidexterity is positive rather than
curvilinear, thereby not supporting Hypothesis 4. Regard-
ing the size of the three significant main effects, two
significant differences appear. That is, the coefficient of
participation in cross-functional interfaces is larger than
the coefficient of decision-making authority (t-value of
difference = 247; p < 005; 2-tailed testing), and the
coefficient of connectedness is larger than the coefficient
of decision-making authority (t-value of difference =
194; p < 005; two-tailed testing). Hence, the direct
effect of the two personal coordination mechanisms on
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managers’ ambidexterity is larger than the direct effect
of the formal structural coordination mechanisms.
Tests of Interaction Effects. Model 3 of Table 3 shows
the interaction effects referring to Hypotheses 5–8. As
the inclusion of connectedness squared did not signif-
icantly improve model fit (Model 2 of Table 3), we
dropped the squared term in Model 3 (e.g. Katila and
Ahuja 2002). The interaction term between a manager’s
decision-making authority and participation in cross-
functional interfaces by the manager is positive and
significant ( = 012, p < 0001), supporting Hypoth-
esis 5. Hypothesis 6 is also supported because the
interaction term between a manager’s decision-making
authority and the manager’s connectedness to other orga-
nization members is positive and significant (= 009,
p < 001). The interaction term between formalization
of a manager’s tasks and the manager’s participation
in cross-functional interfaces is positive and significant
(= 009, p < 001), supporting Hypothesis 7. Hypoth-
esis 8 is also supported because the interaction term
between formalization of a manager’s tasks and the man-
ager’s connectedness to other organization members is
positive and significant ( = 011, p < 001). These
results indicate that positive interaction effects exist
between the formal structural and the personal coordina-
tion mechanisms on managers’ ambidexterity. There are
no significant differences between the four interaction
effects in terms of their size.
Post Hoc Analyses. The sample’s managers can be
grouped into different functional areas, firms, and hier-
archical levels. We conducted several post hoc analyses,
which indicate that (1) possible functional area, firm,
or hierarchical level specific characteristics are not driv-
ing the results of the paper as presented in Table 3 and
(2) the results as reported in Table 3 do not signifi-
cantly differ across functional area, firm, or hierarchi-
cal level subgroups of managers. With respect to the
second result, there are two exceptions: the effect of
decision-making authority on ambidexterity is larger for
operational level managers than for business unit level
managers, whereas the effect of participation in cross-
functional interfaces on ambidexterity is larger for busi-
ness unit level managers than for operational level man-
agers. For the detailed procedures and results of the post
hoc analyses, refer to Appendix 2.
Discussion and Conclusion
The current body of research on ambidexterity focuses
on firm and business unit level ambidexterity. Although
some scholars explicitly argue that “ambidextrous orga-
nizations need ambidextrous senior teams and man-
agers” (O’Reilly and Tushman 2004, p. 81), conceptual
and empirically validated understanding about what is
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Table 3 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for a Manager’s Ambidexterity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b (s.e.)  b (s.e.)  b (s.e.) 
Intercept 1694 (1.91) 1957 (1.84) 1931 (1.77)
Main effects
A manager’s decision-making authority 057 (0.15) 014∗∗∗ 052 (0.15) 013∗∗∗
Formalization of a manager’s tasks 013 (0.17) 003 016 (0.16) 003
Part. in cross-functional interfaces by a manager 101 (0.18) 019∗∗∗ 094 (0.17) 018∗∗∗
Connectedness of a manager to other org. members 085 (0.18) 017∗∗∗ 083 (0.16) 017∗∗∗
Connectedness-squared 009 (0.10) 003
Interaction effects
Dec. making authority ∗Cross-fun. interfaces 036 (0.10) 012∗∗∗
Dec. making authority ∗Connectedness 027 (0.09) 009∗∗
Formalization ∗Cross-fun. interfaces 031 (0.11) 009∗∗
Formalization ∗Connectedness 035 (0.10) 011∗∗
Control variables
Age −011 (0.04) −014∗∗ −010 (0.04) −013∗∗ −011 (0.03) −013∗∗
Education: master’s or higher 089 (0.69) 007 084 (0.65) 006 083 (0.63) 006
Education: bachelor’s 098 (0.68) 007 081 (0.64) 006 085 (0.62) 006
Tenure in firm 011 (0.04) 013∗∗ 009 (0.04) 011∗ 008 (0.04) 009∗
Tenure in current function −021 (0.06) −013∗∗∗ −017 (0.06) −010∗∗ −016 (0.05) −009∗∗
Size (log) 028 (0.78) 002 053 (0.73) 004 049 (0.71) 004
Hierarchical level 324 (0.92) 022∗∗∗ 229 (0.87) 015∗∗ 230 (0.83) 015∗∗
Function: R&D 029 (0.59) 002 018 (0.55) 001 021 (0.53) 001
Function: M&S 041 (0.58) 003 029 (0.54) 002 049 (0.52) 003
Environmental dynamism 131 (0.18) 025∗∗∗ 063 (0.19) 012∗∗ 070 (0.18) 013∗∗∗
Firm A 353 (0.87) 019∗∗∗ 263 (0.86) 014∗∗ 236 (0.83) 012∗∗
Firm B −028 (0.79) −002 −004 (0.74) 000 −021 (0.71) −001
Firm C −125 (0.75) −008† −057 (0.71) −004 −055 (0.68) −004
Firm D −113 (0.82) −007 −100 (0.77) −006 −129 (0.74) −008†
R-squared 023 033 038
Adjusted R-squared 021 031 036
F improvement of fit 1464∗∗∗ 2051∗∗∗ 1497∗∗∗
Notes. Centered data; Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses, as well as standardized coefficients;
N = 716; †p < 010; ∗p < 005; ∗∗p < 001; ∗∗∗p < 0001.
ambidexterity at the manager level of analysis, and about
variation in managers’ ambidexterity, is still underde-
veloped (Gupta et al. 2006, Raisch and Birkinshaw
2008). This paper contributed to further understanding
on both issues in three ways: (1) by proposing and
clarifying three related characteristics of ambidextrous
managers by integrating insights from prior research;
(2) by developing a model and associated hypotheses on
both the direct and interaction effects of formal struc-
tural and personal coordination mechanisms on man-
agers’ ambidexterity; and (3) by testing the hypotheses
based on a sample of 716 business unit level and oper-
ational level managers. The paper’s contributions raise
several important issues for both theory and practice.
First, whether ambidextrous managers may exist, i.e.,
whether exploration and exploitation exclude each other
at the individual level of analysis, is still debated
(cf. Gupta et al. 2006). Although it may be argued to
be “very difficult for an individual to  excel at both
exploration and exploitation” (Gupta et al. 2006, p. 696),
this paper demonstrates that these difficulties are not
insurmountable. By integrating insights from previous
studies, we theorized and illustrated three related char-
acteristics of ambidextrous managers. Empirically, the
paper also demonstrates that managers can indeed be
ambidextrous; i.e., they may engage in high levels
of both exploration and exploitation related activities.
This is, for instance, illustrated by the results of the
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses which
show that exploration and exploitation are two distinct
latent factors of a second order construct; managers’
ambidexterity. This indicates that managers’ exploration
and exploitation activities are not mutually exclusive
ends of a continuum. Furthermore, as the data indicates,
managers differ in the extent to which they are ambidex-
trous. Whereas some are not ambidextrous because they
focus on either exploration or exploitation, others are
ambidextrous because they engage in high levels of both
exploration and exploitation related activities.
Second, the paper furthers theoretical and empirically
validated understanding about variation in managers’ am-
bidexterity by developing and testing hypotheses on the
direct effects of formal structural and personal coordina-
tion mechanisms on managers’ ambidexterity. Existing
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studies on firm or business unit level ambidexterity
mostly put forward structural mechanisms for advancing
ambidexterity (e.g., Benner and Tushman 2003, Duncan
1976), whereas others have illustrated the importance of
more personal relationships (e.g., Birkinshaw and Gib-
son 2004, Subramaniam and Youndt 2005). Regarding
individual level ambidexterity, the hypotheses of this
paper indicate that both kinds of mechanisms matter for
managers’ ambidexterity. However, empirical findings
on the direct effects indicate that both types might not be
equally effective. Instead, the findings emphasize the rel-
atively large effect of the personal types of coordination
mechanisms as compared to the formal structural types
of mechanisms on managers’ ambidexterity. This is in
line with recent studies on learning and coordination
that indicate the importance of more informal and per-
sonal types of coordination for shaping knowledge and
learning related processes and activities of organization
members (e.g., Argote et al. 2003, Faraj and Xiao 2006).
Interestingly, two hypotheses on the direct effects
were not confirmed. With regard to formalization of
a manager’s tasks (Hypothesis 2), our findings did
not provide support for the predicted negative rela-
tion with a manager’s ambidexterity. This may concur
with recent insights that suggest that formalized routines
may increase information flows to managers, which may
improve their overall quality and speed of decision mak-
ing (Baum and Wally 2003). Formalized rules and pro-
cedures may also include processes for effecting change
(Adler and Borys 1996), which corresponds to the Adler
et al. (1999, p. 45) concept of “metaroutines” that may
enable organizations to become more ambidextrous by
transforming nonroutine tasks into more-routine ones. As
the effect of formalization on individuals’ behavior may
be contingent on its design, future studies could differ-
entiate between types of formalization, such as enabling
and coercive types (Adler and Borys 1996). Regarding
connectedness of a manager to other organization mem-
bers across hierarchical levels and organization units,
Hypothesis 4 predicted an inverted U-shaped relationship
with this manager’s ambidexterity. Instead, we found the
relationship to be positive rather than curvilinear. Appar-
ently, the expected dampening effects of increasing lev-
els of connectedness on managers’ ambidexterity are not
present in the data sample. A possible explanation may be
the study’s research context of large firms in which mem-
bers of organization units may differ considerably from
each other in terms of values, norms, and their knowl-
edge base, due to different products or services they pro-
vide, different technologies or processes they apply, and
different markets they serve. Hence, future research may
examine the impact of other characteristics of managers’
personal networks such as the level of heterogeneity,
which may make the diffusion of strong norms and the
creation of a dominant logic more difficult, even if the
network is densely connected (Reagans and Zuckerman
2001, Rodan and Galunic 2004, Smith et al. 2005).
Third, the paper develops theoretical and empirically
validated understanding about variation in managers’
ambidexterity by developing and testing hypotheses on
the interaction effects of formal structural and per-
sonal coordination mechanisms on managers’ ambidex-
terity. Not only empirically validated insight but also
theoretical insight on the combined effect of different
organizational elements on ambidexterity is scarce in the
literature on ambidexterity (see, e.g., Jansen et al. 2006,
Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003). This gap is highlighted by
Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008, p. 399), who argue that
“the interrelations between different antecedents” have
thus far “been neglected or not been fully conceptualized
in the literature on ambidexterity.” Consequently, they
argue to “develop and test propositions on how different
antecedents interact and complement one another in a
firm’s pursuit of organizational ambidexterity” (Raisch
and Birkinshaw 2008, p. 399). This paper’s interaction
hypotheses and the associated results indicate positive
interaction effects between the formal structural and the
personal coordination mechanisms. Hence, an interesting
finding, also for managerial practice, is that the com-
bined effect of the two types of coordination mecha-
nisms on managers’ ambidexterity is larger than simply
the sum of their independent effects. In other words,
complementing formal structural coordination mecha-
nisms with personal mechanisms increases the mecha-
nisms’ contribution to managers’ ambidexterity.
The paper’s hypotheses and empirical findings on the
interaction effects seem also to provide new avenues
for research on new organizational forms. A well-
established stream in contingency theory has examined
mechanistic versus organic forms, stressing internal
fit and consistency between coordination mechanisms
(Burns and Stalker 1961, Duncan 1976, Lawrence and
Lorsch 1967). However, our results seem to support
hybrid or simultaneous forms that combine the formal
structure with strong cross-functional integration and
internal networks. In these illogical designs, accord-
ing to contingency theory, there is a coexistence of
formal organization structure and horizontal ties. Man-
agers responsible for ambidextrous forms can choose
to compensate their formal mechanistic structure by
encouraging decision-making authority, cross-functional
interfaces, and connectedness among their managers. On
the other hand, they can also seize upon the formaliza-
tion devices to solidify and extend a more homogeneous
orientation of their managers. This simultaneous expres-
sion of formal hierarchical structure and horizontal rela-
tionships fosters their managers’ ambidexterity.
Fourth, results of the post hoc analysis indicate that
the effect of decision-making authority on ambidexterity
is larger for operational level manager than for business
unit level managers, whereas the effect of participation
in cross-functional interfaces on ambidexterity is larger
for business unit level managers than for operational
level managers. These findings highlight the particular
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importance, also for managerial practice, of personal co-
ordination mechanisms for business unit level managers’
ambidexterity. This is in line with studies on strategy
process research, which indicate that business unit level
managers focus on establishing interactions and building
relationships between different hierarchical levels, orga-
nization units, and functions, for conducting exploration
and exploitation related activities (Burgelman 1983,
Floyd and Lane 2000). One of the main characteristics
of cross-functional interfaces is that they allow for esta-
blishing interactions and building relationships across
internal vertical, horizontal, and lateral organizational
boundaries (Martinez and Jarillo 1989, Galbraith 1973).
Therefore, cross-functional interfaces may have greater
capacity for enabling business unit level managers’
ambidexterity as compared to operational level man-
agers’ ambidexterity. An interesting finding, also for
managerial practice, is the importance of formal struc-
tural coordination mechanisms for operational level man-
agers’ ambidexterity. This is in line with, among others,
Floyd and Lane (2000), who stress the importance of for-
mal structural mechanisms for shaping lower level man-
agers’ exploration and exploitation activities.
Finally, investigating ambidexterity at the manager
level of analysis raises the question about the locus of
action, i.e., about who exerts control on the coordi-
nation mechanisms to enable managers’ ambidexterity.
Several studies on ambidexterity at the firm and business
unit level of analysis indicate the importance of corpo-
rate or most senior management for controlling formal
structural elements (e.g., Duncan 1976, Tushman and
O’Reilly 1996) and for developing the organization con-
text (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004, p. 223). Investigating
ambidexterity at the manager level of analysis highlights
an important insight for managerial practice: the impor-
tance of both these managers’ supervisors, which may
reside at lower levels in the organization than corpo-
rate management, and the managers themselves for shap-
ing these managers’ surroundings, and, consequently,
their ambidexterity. We argue that regarding a manager’s
decision-making authority and formalization of tasks,
and to a large extent participation in cross-functional
interfaces, the locus of action is most likely with that
manager’s direct supervisor and that manager’s supervi-
sors at higher levels. With regard to the connectedness
of a manager to other organization members, the locus
of action may be more with the manager him- or herself,
as connectedness comprises a more “voluntary and per-
sonal mode of coordination” (Tsai 2002, p. 181). These
arguments are in line with, for instance, McDonough and
Leifer (1983), who argue and empirically demonstrate
that a “supervisor may employ different structures at
the same time for use by different individuals or groups
within the work unit” (1983, p. 728).
Limitations and Future Research
Our study has limitations, suggesting several issues
for future research. The study involves cross-sectional,
single informant data and uses perceptual scales
highlighting issues of common method bias and causal
reciprocity. Regarding the issue of common method
bias, we performed Harman’s one-factor test on items
included in the regression models. If common method
bias were a serious problem in the study, we would
expect a single factor to emerge to account for most of
the covariance in the dependent and independent vari-
ables (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). We did not find such
a single factor. The issue of common method bias could
be addressed in future studies by measuring ambidex-
terity at the managerial level of analysis using objective
measures. Furthermore, as indicated, our methods are
suited to establish relationships between the constructs,
but not causality. To create more insight in the direc-
tion of causality, future studies may adopt a longitudinal
approach to increase insight into how changes in coordi-
nation mechanisms and changes in managers’ ambidex-
terity causally relate to each other. Related to the
question of causality is the discussion above on the locus
of action. Future research could create more insight into
this issue by adopting a multiple level approach examin-
ing interactions between actions and decisions of man-
agers of different hierarchical levels. Furthermore, we
limited the focus of this paper by investigating how dif-
ferent coordination mechanisms relate to the ambidex-
trous behavior of managers. Although this leads to valu-
able and actionable knowledge, future research could
investigate other potential factors that relate to man-
agers’ ambidexterity. For instance, the results on the con-
trol variables indicate that demographic factors such as
age, tenure in the firm, and tenure in the current function
significantly relate to managers’ ambidexterity. Future
research could delve into the role of moderators, such
as the hierarchical level of managers. Another limitation
of this paper in this respect is that we did not explic-
itly address external drivers of managers’ ambidexter-
ity, except that we controlled for the impact of environ-
mental dynamism. Hence, future research could explore
and compare, for instance, the impact on managers’
ambidexterity of formal inter-organizational personal
relationships, like task forces with suppliers or clients,
and more informal direct contacts with these external
constituencies. Finally, in the introduction section of the
paper, we illustrated that previous research indicates the
relevance of investigating managers’ ambidexterity for
increasing understanding about how to build ambidex-
terity in a firm. In a related vein, it is also interesting to
explicitly examine the relationships between managers’
ambidextrous behavior and the firm’s or business unit’s
level of ambidexterity and performance.
Despite these limitations, in response to the call for
research into variations in managers’ ambidexterity, this
paper contributed to the literature by investigating, both
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conceptually and empirically, ambidexterity at the man-
ager level of analysis and how different types of coor-
dination mechanisms relate to variations in managers’
ambidexterity. By doing so, we contributed to both the-
oretical and empirical foundations of the concept of
ambidextrous organizations and their managers.
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Appendix 1. Measures and Items of Explanatory
Variables at the Manager Level2
A manager’s decision-making authority (based on Dewar
et al. 1980)
I can undertake little action until my supervisor approves a
decision.
If I want to make my own decisions, I will be quickly
discouraged.
I have to ask my supervisor before I do almost everything.
Any decision I make has to have my supervisor’s approval.
Formalization of a manager’s tasks (based on Desphande
and Zaltman 1982)
Whatever situation arises, I have procedures to follow in
dealing with it.
I have to follow strict operational procedures at all times.
Rules occupy a central place in my work related activities.
There is a written job description for going about my tasks.
Participation in cross-functional interfaces by a manager
(based on Gupta and Govindarajan 2000, Nadler and Tushman
1987)
I coordinate work across internal organizational boundaries.
I work in temporary task forces.
I work in permanent teams.
Connectedness of a manager to other organization mem-
bers (based on Jaworski and Kohli 1993)
There are many opportunities for me to talk to individuals
from all kinds of different organizational units.
I very frequently have contact with people, regardless of
rank or position.
The personal network I have throughout the organization
can be called “extensive.”
I feel very comfortable calling others, regardless of rank,
position, or organizational unit, when the need arises.
Appendix 2. Post Hoc Analyses
The sample’s managers can be grouped into different func-
tional areas, firms, and hierarchical levels. We investigated
whether possible functional area, firm, and hierarchical level
specific characteristics are driving the results and whether the
results differ across functional area, firm, and hierarchical level
subgroups of managers. To do so, we first examined whether
significant interaction effects exist between the four indepen-
dent variables and functional area, firm, and hierarchical level,
on managers’ ambidexterity. Second, we examined whether
the main effects that were found to be significant in Model 3
of Table 3 remain significant after including the functional
area, firm, and hierarchical level interaction terms. Finally, we
split the total sample into functional area, firm, and hierarchi-
cal level subgroups of managers to examine the main effects
within each separate subgroup (Aiken and West 1991, Hardy
1993, Jaccard and Turrisi 2003).
After having created interaction terms of the dummy vari-
ables pertaining to the functional areas with the four inde-
pendent variables, we included these interaction terms in
regression Model 3 of Table 3. Results are as follows: First, the
interaction terms are not significant, and including the inter-
action terms does not result in a significant improvement of
model fit. Second, the three main effects that are found to be
significant in Model 3 of Table 3 remain significant, whereas
the main effect of formalization of tasks remains insignifi-
cant. Finally, the four main effects in each of the three func-
tional area subsamples are the same as those in the total sam-
ple; i.e., within each of the three functional area subsamples
there is no significant relation between formalization of tasks
and managers’ ambidexterity, but there are positive and sig-
nificant relations between decision-making authority, partic-
ipation in cross-functional interfaces, and connectedness, on
managers’ ambidexterity. These results indicate that functional
area does not moderate the relation between the independent
variables and managers’ ambidexterity, that possible functional
area specific characteristics are not driving the results as pre-
sented in Model 3 of Table 3, and that the results as presented
in Model 3 of Table 3 do not differ across functional area
subgroups.
After having created interaction terms of the dummy vari-
ables pertaining to the firms with the four independent
variables, we included these interaction terms in regression
Model 3 of Table 3. Results are the same as those for func-
tional area: First, the interaction terms are not significant, and
there is no significant improvement of model fit. Second, the
three main effects that are found to be significant in Model 3 of
Table 3 remain significant, whereas the main effect of formal-
ization of tasks remains insignificant. Finally, the four main
effects in each of the five firm subsamples are the same as
those in the total sample. These results indicate that firm spe-
cific characteristics do not moderate the relation between the
independent variables and managers’ ambidexterity, that pos-
sible firm specific characteristics are not driving the results
as presented in Model 3 of Table 3, and that the results as
presented in Model 3 of Table 3 do not differ across firms.
After having created interaction terms of the dummy vari-
ables pertaining to the hierarchical levels with the four inde-
pendent variables, we included these interaction terms in
regression Model 3 of Table 3. Including these interaction
terms, first, results in a significant improvement of model fit.
More specifically, results indicate that the effect of decision-
making authority on ambidexterity is larger for operational
level manager than for business unit level managers, whereas
the effect of participation in cross-functional interfaces on
ambidexterity is larger for business unit level managers than
for operational level managers. Second, notwithstanding these
significant interaction effects, the three main effects that are
found to be significant in Model 3 of Table 3 remain signifi-
cant after inclusion of the interaction terms, whereas the main
effect of formalization of tasks remains insignificant. Finally,
the four main effects in both hierarchical level subsamples
are the same as those in the total sample, except the effect
of managers’ decision-making authority, which is positive but
not significant in the business unit level subsample. These
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results indicate that hierarchical level does moderate the rela-
tion between two of the independent variables and managers’
ambidexterity but that possible hierarchical level specific char-
acteristics are not driving the results as presented in Model 3
of Table 3.
Endnotes
1We identified two cases with residual values larger than three
standard deviations (Aiken and West 1991). Excluding these
two outliers did not change any of the results.
2All items were measured on a seven-point scale (1 = “to a
very small extent” or “strongly disagree” to 7 = “to a very
large extent” or “strongly agree”).
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